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When the costs are decreasing workers adopt technology at the point where the costs equal the
increased productivity. Output per worker increases immediately, while productivity beneﬁts increase
only gradually if costs continue to fall. As a result, workers in computer-adopting labor market
groups experience an immediate fall in wages due to increased supply. On the other hand, adopting
workers experience wage increases with some delay. This model explains why increased computer use
does not immediately lead to higher wage inequality. More speciﬁcally, the results of the model are
shown to be consistent with the question why within-group wage inequality among skilled workers as
a result of computer technology adoption in the United States increased in the 1970s, while between-
group wage inequality and within-group wage inequality among the unskilled did not start to
increase until the 1980s. The model also predicts that the more compressed German wage structure
leads to a lagged diffusion of computer technology along with smaller changes in wage inequality.
Our empirical analysis suggests that this is consistent with the actual developments in Germany since
the 1980s. Finally, the theoretical predictions seem to be of the right magnitude to explain the
empirical quantities observed in the data.
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It has been well documented that wage inequality between college graduates and high
school graduates in the United States has accelerated upon the emergence and diffusion of
computer technology, and related information and communication technologies, in the
labor market.1 Many have suggested that the increase in wage inequality since the early
1980s has been caused by the complementarity between computer technology and skilled
labor.2 Indeed, the use of computer technology at work is more concentrated among
skilled workers and associated with higher earnings: In 1984 (1997) 45.2% (76.6%) of the
college graduates used computer technology at work compared to 21.6% (42.8%) of the
high school graduates (see Table 1 below), and Krueger (1993) estimated wage differentials
between computer users and non-users between 14% and 22% explaining half of the
widening of the educational wage gap in the period 1984–1989.3
Linking increased wage inequality to the adoption and diffusion of computer technology
leads to a number of questions, however. First, the use and impact of computer technology
on the organization of work and the demand for labor dates back to at least the 1950s,
mainframe computers started to be extensively used in the early 1960s, and already in the
early 1970s a non-negligible part of the workforce had access to computer technology,
which did not lead to a rise in relative wages at that time.4 Only the introduction of the
Apple II in 1977 and the PC in 1981 can be connected to the rise in between-group wage
inequality since the early 1980s. So, why did wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers resulting from the adoption of computer technology not already rise in the 1960s
and 1970s and is computerization viewed as a factor contributing to acceleration in skill
demand during the 1980s and 1990s only? Second, the behavior of within-group wage
inequality reveals a steady increase in the 9010th percentile for college graduates in the
period 1963–2000 and a rather constant pattern until 1980 and an increase afterwards for
high school graduates (e.g., Juhn et al., 1993). Why is this?5 Third, wage inequality has
increased strongly in the United States (and Great Britain) in the 1980s and 1990s but not
in continental European countries such as Germany and France. Of course, institutional
factors are likely to have a stronger impact on European wage structures (e.g., Katz et al.,
1995; Blau and Kahn, 1996), but is it really the case that the same technology did not have
similar labor market effects in Europe too?
In this paper we propose a model to understand the impact of computerization on the
pattern and timing of wage inequality. We do so by explicitly taking into account the
diffusion process of computer technology, starting from the observation that computer-
ization increases individual productivity but also the supply of efﬁciency units of labor.1See e.g., Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Katz and Autor (1999), Acemoglu (2002), Aghion (2002) and
Card and DiNardo (2002).
2E.g., Levy and Murnane (1996), Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-Oener (2006) ﬁnd that computer technology
generally substitutes for routine tasks and complements the performance of non-routine cognitive tasks. Borghans
et al. (2006) ﬁnd that people skills are also complementary to computer use.
3Whether this wage differential is causal and represents a measure of returns to (computer) skills or is to be
explained by other factors is subject to debate (see e.g., Bell, 1996; DiNardo and Pischke, 1997; Borghans and ter
Weel, 2004a).
4See e.g., Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) and ter Weel (2006) for overviews of these developments.
5Indeed, Autor et al. (1998, Footnote 4) state that their empirical analysis suffers from criticism with regard to
the fact that although relative wages and within-group wage inequality seem to move similarly in the 1980s, they
appear to have evolved differently in the 1960s and 1970s.
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Table 1
Computer technology use in the United States and Germanya
Year Skilled Unskilled
United States 1984 .452 .216
1989 .628 .331
1993 .704 .376
1997 .766 .428
Germany 1985 .300 .161
1989 – –
1992 .589 .302
1998 .834 .462
Difference (United StatesGermany) 1984 .152 .056
1993 .115 .074
1997 .068 .034
aComputer technology use in the United States is available from the October Supplements to the CPS. For
Germany the numbers are referring to 1985, 1992 and 1998 and are taken from the Qualiﬁcation and Career
Survey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) and the Federal Employment Service
(IAB). The data refer to workers employed on a full-time and full-year basis. – indicates no observations available.
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 717Hence, computer use by one worker negatively affects workers who are substitutes. The
key innovation of the paper is to conceptualize the computer adoption problem from the
perspective of the worker whether or not to adopt computer technology. The model
contains three main features. First, we explicitly model the assignment of computer
technology to workers. Second, the decision to adopt a computer is based on individual
cost–beneﬁt considerations weighing productivity beneﬁts against costs, which induces
adoption among high-wage workers ﬁrst. Third, we distinguish skilled and unskilled
workers and allow for productivity differences between workers. As a result of these
differences, not all workers adopt at the same time and limited substitution between the
two types of workers leads to different effects on the wage structure.
The main results from this model are the following. The timing and pattern of wage
inequality is different for between-group and within-group wage inequality. Between-
group wage inequality is falling when the ﬁrst skilled workers adopt computers because the
supply of additional efﬁciency units of labor outweighs productivity gains. When more
skilled workers adopt computer technology, and when the ﬁrst unskilled workers start to
use computers, between-group wage inequality increases strongly because the productivity
gains skilled workers experience outweigh the additional supply of skilled labor in
efﬁciency units and the supply of additional units of unskilled labor increases relative
wages. Eventually, when all workers have adopted computer technology, wage inequality
falls to a level depending on differences in productivity gains: If skilled (unskilled) workers
experience higher productivity gains, between-group wage inequality will be permanently
higher (lower).6 The short run effects of between-group wage inequality are much
more pronounced than the long run effects. We also show that the maximum level of6Consistent with Galor and Moav (2000) the new level of relative wages—after complete diffusion of computer
technology—may reﬂect in the long run either a skill-biased or skill-saving technological change. However, in the
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account for the observed differences in the changes in wage inequality between Anglo-
Saxon countries on the one hand and continental European countries on the other hand.
Within-group wage inequality for skilled (unskilled) workers is increasing once the ﬁrst
skilled (unskilled) workers adopt computer technology. This rise is caused by the fact that
all workers in a group suffer from the additional supply of efﬁciency units, whereas only
the adopters beneﬁt from productivity increases. If all workers within a group have
adopted computer technology, within-group wage inequality falls to the level prior to
computer adoption if the productivity gains for every worker within the same group are
equal.
Empirically, we obtain that the model is consistent with the development of the wage
structure in the United States over the past decades. The increase in within-group wage
inequality measured over the period 1974–1997 is consistent with a 30% increase in
productivity related to the computer technology use of both skilled and unskilled workers,
which is consistent with the estimates of the productivity effects of computer technology
adoption presented by Bresnahan et al. (2002). The mechanism we explore in this paper is
able to explain approximately one-third of the time trend in wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers. We also investigate the German wage structure in the 1980s
and 1990s and ﬁnd that the diffusion of computer technology is consistent with the
properties of the German wage distribution. Because of a more compressed wage structure,
computer technology has initially been adopted at a slower pace compared to the United
States. For that reason no large effects on the wage structure were to be expected in the
1980s. However, this compressed wage structure has resulted in a strong increase in
computer use in the 1990s. Current computer technology use in Germany is now as high as
in the United States and we ﬁnd ﬁgures suggesting that wage inequality has a tendency to
rise. In addition, the pattern of wage inequality is consistent with the adoption of computer
technology among different groups in the labor market.
This paper is related to the older literature on the diffusion of technology, including the
work of Griliches (1957, 1958), Mansﬁeld (1961, 1965), David (1969), Stoneman (1976),
and Davies (1979), who argue that the costs of technology are important determinants of
adoption and diffusion. In this paper, (endogenous) wages and productivity gains
determine whether computer adoption is beneﬁcial, whereas previous models treat the
determinants of the diffusion process mostly exogenously. Our paper is also related to and
extends the recent models of Acemoglu (1998) and Galor and Moav (2000) by explaining
both the timing and the pattern of between-group and within-group wage inequality.
Acemoglu (2002) uses the argument that, once invented, technologies are non-rival goods
and can be used at low marginal cost. He then shows that technological change is directed
towards the production of skill-complementary technologies because the market size for
these technologies has become larger since the 1970s (see also Kiley, 1999). To explain
between-group wage inequality, the upward pressure on relative wages from directed
technological change has to dominate the downward pressure resulting from substitution.
To explain within-group wage inequality he applies the assumption that not all skilled(footnote continued)
transition state towards full adoption of computer technology relative wages within and between groups of
workers are mostly in accordance with a skill-biased technological change explanation.
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premium, but endogenous technological change immediately beneﬁts the more able
workers in both the skilled and unskilled groups. We argue that within-group wage
inequality for unskilled workers did not increase until the early 1980s, we do not need an
ability bias or adaptability assumptions to explain adoption patterns, and we argue that
the costs of computer adoption and its use are non-negligible relative to wages. Galor and
Moav (2000) assume that the level of human capital of skilled and unskilled workers is
determined by their ability as well as the technological environment because human capital
is assumed to be technology speciﬁc. In this way, technological change reduces the
adaptability of existing human capital for the new technological environment but increases
the productivity of workers operating with the new technology.8 Finally, an increase in the
rate of technological change raises the returns to skilled labor, which induces more agents
to become skilled. We improve upon their analysis by arguing that eventually there are
applications for every worker, the increase in skilled labor supply happened before
computer technology was widely applied which seems inconsistent with their story of
increasingly more people becoming skilled when the returns go up, and we do not need to
assume that adaptability to computer technology plays a major role in its adoption to
explain the developments of the U.S. and German wage structures.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the patterns of wage inequality in
the United States and provides a comparison with the German wage structure. Section 3
presents the basic model. Section 4 shows the pattern and timing of wage inequality.
Section 5 presents estimates for the United States and Germany consistent with the model
and provides a benchmark for assessing whether the theoretical predictions are of the right
magnitude to explain the empirical quantities observed. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
2.1. The distribution of wages
Computer technology is likely to have inﬂuenced the wage structure and labor demand
in several ways. Assuming that the adoption of computer technology increases
productivity, two factors inﬂuencing the wage structure have to be distinguished. First,
there will be an individual productivity increase for workers adopting computers, which
increases their wages. Second, increased productivity also increases the number of
efﬁciency units of labor, inﬂuencing all workers’ wages, depending on how substitutable
they are. Hence, besides an individual effect, related to productivity, changes in the wage
structure depend on the composition of distinctive groups of workers in the labor market.
We deﬁne wage differences between workers with different productivity levels belonging to
the same labor market group as within-group wage inequality and differences between
workers in different groups as between-group wage inequality. We assume that all workers
within a group are perfect substitutes and that substitutability between groups is limited.7See also Galor and Tsiddon (1997) who argue that ability is more valuable in periods of rapid technological
change, and Betts (1994) and Caselli (1999) who suggest that high-ability workers beneﬁt from (skill-biased)
technological change thereby explaining wage inequality.
8See also Chari and Hopenhayen (1991), Heckman et al. (1998), Gould et al. (2001), Weinberg (2001), Aghion
et al. (2002) and Violante (2002) for similar assumptions about obsolescence and transferability problems of
(parts) of the human capital stock when a new technology arrives.
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Fig. 1. Wage inequality in the United States and Germany. Panel A: ln(90th percentile skilled) ln(10th percentile
unskilled), Panel B: ln(90th percentile skilled) ln(10th percentile unskilled), Panel C: ln(90th percentile
unskilled) ln(10th percentile unskilled). Note: Data are for the United States taken from the March CPS,
1964–2001. Skilled workers are college graduates and higher; unskilled workers are the remaining ones. See
Appendix A for details about the U.S. data. The data for Germany are taken from the GSOEP, 1984–2001.
Skilled workers are those with at least college education (Fachhochschule); unskilled workers are the remaining
ones. See Appendix B for details about the German data.
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748720Although in practice the substitution structure in the labor market will be more
complicated, for simplicity we only assume a distinction between two groups of workers:
Skilled and unskilled. We deﬁne skilled workers as those with at least a college degree, and
unskilled workers as the ones with a level of education below a college degree.99An analysis of the entire labor market distinguishes our study of the impact of computer technology on wages
from the one by Autor et al. (1998). They analyze the impact of computer adoption on the employment and wages
of constructed series of college graduates and high school graduates. Since for our argument the distribution of
productivity differentials plays a crucial role, an analysis of the entire wage distribution is more appropriate for
the purpose of this paper.
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L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 721Fig. 1 shows three pictures of relative annual wages in the United States in the period
1963–2000 and three pictures for Germany in the period 1984–2001. The picture presented
in the ﬁrst panel of Fig. 1 contains the difference between log wages of the 90th percentile
of the skilled workers and the 10th percentile of the unskilled workers, which we apply as a
measure of between-group wage inequality. The picture for the United States—using the
March CPS ﬁles10—reveals that until 1980 this wage differential remains fairly constant,
but afterwards it rises substantially (almost 20%).11 The second and third panels of Fig. 1
show the 90 10th wage differential within the groups of skilled and unskilled workers,
which we apply as measures of within-group wage inequality. For the United States, the
patterns that become apparent in these pictures look somewhat distinct. Within-group
wage inequality among skilled workers steadily increases since the mid-1960s, and within-
group wage inequality among unskilled workers seems to be fairly constant until 1980 and
rising ever since. Testing for breaks in the data reveals that there is a signiﬁcant break in
between-group wage inequality and within-group wage inequality among unskilled
workers around 1980.
For Germany three similar pictures are reported in Fig. 1. We use the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) to construct the series. Between-group wage inequality in
Germany seems to be falling until the mid-1990s and rising somewhat afterwards. Within-
group wage inequality among skilled workers is ﬂuctuating but reveals no trends. The level
of within-group wage inequality among unskilled workers has narrowed until the early
1990s and remains constant afterwards. The overall pattern of wage inequality in Germany
stands in sharp contrast to the trends in wage inequality in the United States.12 In the
United States a change in the trends of between-group and within-group wage inequality
among the unskilled can be observed around 1980, while in Germany no major changes are
observed in the 1980s. Indeed, the changes since the early 1990s in Germany are similar,
but less pronounced, to the U.S. trends in the 1980s. Testing for breaks in the data reveals
that there is a signiﬁcant break in between-group wage inequality and within-group wage
inequality among unskilled workers around 1990.2.2. The diffusion of computers
Table 1 reports the percentage computer technology use for skilled and unskilled
workers in the United States and Germany. The U.S. data are taken from the October10Recently, DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lemieux (2006) have argued that it would be better to use the MAY/
ORG CPS ﬁles instead of the March ﬁles. In Appendix C we provide arguments why for the purpose of the
present paper it is better to use the March series. The samples are constructed as described in Appendix A.
11These numbers are consistent with the ones presented by Katz and Autor (1999, Figure 3) and Juhn et al.
(1993, Figure 4) using weekly wages by percentile. Katz and Autor split the sample between male and female
workers, but the overall picture looks similar. It is also consistent with their ﬁgures on overall wage inequality for
the period 1963–1995 (Katz and Autor, 1999, Figure 4).
12See e.g., Abraham and Houseman (1995) for an analysis concerning the differences in wage inequality in
Germany and the United States. They ﬁnd that wage setting institutions are one explanation for the different
trends in both countries. In addition, the German supply of skilled workers accelerated relative to the United
States in the 1980s, which may help explain the divergent trends in wage inequality in Germany and the United
States (given demand). Finally, the distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is likely to be less clear in
Germany because the German educational system does a better job of supplying workers with skills. This is likely
to compress the wage structure relative to the United States, where there is a more clear distinction between
college graduates and other workers.
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the Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational
Training (BIBB) and the Federal Employment Service (IAB) in three years close to the
points of measurement in the CPS (1985, 1992, and 1998). The U.S. ﬁgures show that for
both groups of workers the largest increase in computer technology use at work has taken
place between 1984 and 1989. In Germany the process of computer adoption has evolved
more gradually. In absolute terms the rise in computer technology use is more or less
similar when comparing the increases in computer technology use over the periods
1985–1992 and 1992–1998. The bottom part of the table reports the differences in
computer use between U.S. and German workers in 1984, 1993 and 1997. It is interesting
to observe that computer technology use is higher among both groups in the United States
in the early 1980s and 1990s and that computer technology use in Germany is higher in the
late 1990s. Overall, in 1997/1998 computer use per worker is almost equal in the USA and
Germany.
3. Model
Fig. 1 suggests that wages are both determined by individual productivity levels within
each group and by differences between the two groups of workers. These two effects have a
different impact on the wage structure over time and need to be analyzed separately. To do
so, consider a competitive economy producing a homogeneous good Y. The good is
produced by a labor input consisting of skilled and unskilled workers. Because of
productivity differences among skilled and unskilled workers, we deﬁne the supply in terms
of efﬁciency units as S and U.
3.1. Set up
Production occurs according to a CES production function and equals
Y ¼ ððwSÞr þ ðcUÞrÞ1=r, (1)
where rp1, and the elasticity of substitution between S and U equals s ¼ 1=ð1 rÞ. The
corresponding wages in efﬁciency units are weus and w
eu
u for S and U, and competitive wages
give a standard relative demand equation:
weu  w
eu
s
weuu
¼ cU
wS
 1=s
. (2)
For convenience, weuu is normalized to 1, so w
eu
s ¼ ðwS=cUÞr1.
Productivity levels not only differ between groups, but also within groups. This might be
due to unobserved heterogeneity, but individual productivity levels might also differ from
year to year due to on-the-job learning, aging, sector shifts and other inﬂuences, which
need not be speciﬁed further. We assume that workers are perfectly substitutable within
groups, so any productivity difference is reﬂected in wages.
Productivity depends on the parameters ai½a; a, with aoa for skilled worker i and
bj½b; b, with bob for unskilled worker j. Productivity parameters of skilled and
unskilled workers can only be compared when wages in efﬁciency units are taken into
account. We allow the wage intervals of both groups to overlap. This is consistent with the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 723empirical observation that the wages of the most productive unskilled worker are higher
than the wages of the least productive skilled worker, i.e., bweuu 4 aw
eu
s .
13
To enable an analytical solution of the model, the distribution of the productivity
parameters for skilled and unskilled workers is assumed to take the following form:
PsðaÞ ¼ 1
1 r a
ð2r1Þ=ð1rÞps and PuðbÞ ¼ 1
1 r b
ð2r1Þ=ð1rÞpu,
where
ps ¼ s 1
s
1
as1  as1 and p
u ¼ s 1
s
1
b
s1  bs1
are obtained from solving the integral for the distributions of productivity parameters of
both types of workers. If s ¼ 2 the assumed distribution is such that the wage bill is
uniformly distributed over the productivity parameters a and b. This assumption about the
uniform distribution of productivity parameters is equivalent to the assumption made by
Galor and Moav (2000, p. 477) about the uniformly distributed ability parameters in their
model.
Each worker’s productivity depends on his productivity parameter and whether or not
he uses computer technology. Productivity equals qsi ¼ ai and quj ¼ bj without using
computer technology and qsi ¼ aiys and quj ¼ bjyu when using the technology, where
ys; yu41 are the proportional productivity gains from working with computer technology.
We assume that within groups the productivity gain from using computer technology is the
same, while between groups it is allowed to differ, and that for all workers there exists
some computer application, which makes production more efﬁcient.14
In a competitive labor market, each efﬁciency unit of labor receives the same return and
the individual wage equals the productivity parameter multiplied by the return to an
efﬁciency unit of labor. In such a setting, employers are indifferent between employing a
worker who uses computer technology and one who does not because they pay the same
wage for each efﬁciency unit of labor. This means that both the productivity gain and the
costs of using computer technology are passed on to the worker. Hence, wages equal
wsi ¼ aiweus and wuj ¼ bj for workers who do not use computer technology and wsi ¼
aiw
eu
s y
s  V and wuj ¼ bjyu  V for those who do, where V represents the cost of computer
technology. Note that V is (implicitly) expressed in terms of weuu and could be viewed as the
annual rental price of computer technology.
The individual decision to adopt computer technology can be written as a trade-off
between the increased productivity y and the costs of the computer V, given the worker’s
productivity. The break-even productivity for computer adoption for both types of13To make this overlap of productivity levels consistent with rational individual schooling decisions, we assume
that productivity does not only depend on years of schooling. Differences in innate ability, talent to perform
certain tasks, or age and experience all provide plausible arguments for this assumption.
14The alternative assumption would be to model a complementary relationship between the productivity
parameters a and b and y. Assuming such a relationship leads to earlier adoption of computer technology (given
the costs of adoption) by workers with a proportional productivity gain yi4ys and yj4yu and to later adoption
by workers experiencing proportional productivity gains smaller than ys and yu. As will be shown below, such an
assumption would lead to a similar pattern of diffusion but to a permanently higher level of within-group wage
inequality. In addition, the pattern and timing of between-group wage inequality depends on whether ys4yu or
not.
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abei ¼
V
ðys  1Þweus
(3)
and
bbej ¼
V
ðyu  1Þ . (4)
Eqs. (3) and (4) show that the break-even productivity at which it becomes beneﬁcial to
adopt computer technology falls when (i) the costs of computer use (V) fall,15 (ii) the
proportional productivity gain (ys; yu) becomes larger, and (iii) the wage per efﬁciency unit
of labor (weus ;w
eu
u ) is higher. Assuming that the costs of the computer are the same for each
worker and fall exogenously and continuously over time, the productivity gain and the
wage in terms of efﬁciency units determine the adoption of computer technology for the
individual worker. Hence, computer costs relative to wages determine whether or not it is
beneﬁcial for a worker to adopt computer technology. In addition, differences in computer
use between skilled and unskilled workers also depend on differences in the proportional
productivity gains from using a computer.16 Finally, these equations reveal that the wages
of workers adopting computer technology are not rising immediately by the size of the
proportional productivity gain because the costs of the computer have to be taken into
account. This way of modelling is consistent with the ﬁndings of Entorf and Kramarz
(1997)—using longitudinal data for France—who show that the wages of computer
adopters relative to similar workers not adopting have been rising by some 1–2% a year
after adoption.
The supply of efﬁciency units of labor consists of two components: (i) The sum of all
productivity parameters representing total productivity before computerization, and (ii)
the productivity gains workers experience from using a computer, which equal
S ¼ Se R aa aiPs dai þ Se R aa ðys  1ÞaiPs dai and U ¼ U e R bb bjPu dbj þU e R bb ðyu  1ÞbjPu dbj,
where Se and U e are deﬁned as the supply of skilled and unskilled workers in persons. This
results in the following expressions for the supply of efﬁciency units of labor:
S ¼ Seps ðas  asÞ þ ðys  1Þ as  Vðys  1Þweus
 s  
(5)
and
U ¼ U epu ðbs  bsÞ þ ðyu  1Þ bs  Vðyu  1Þ
 s  
. (6)15Autor et al. (2003) develop a related model using the costs of computer adoption as the driving force behind
adoption. However, they focus on the allocation of human labor input across different tasks and not on the
pattern and timing of wage inequality resulting from computer technology adoption. Borghans and ter Weel
(2004b, 2006) demonstrate how computer technology alters the division of time between different tasks. They
derive that the allocation of time shifts from routine towards non-routine tasks.
16If, all things being equal, ðys  1Þ4ðyu  1Þ, skilled workers gain more in terms of productivity from using a
computer, which is equivalent to arguing that they are more efﬁcient in using the computer. Chennells and Van
Reenen (1997), Entorf and Kramarz (1997), and Entorf et al. (1999) interpret their ﬁndings for the United
Kingdom and France of high-wage workers using computers in favor of such an explanation.
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distribution of the productivity parameters a and b, the productivity gain from using
computer technology y, and the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled
workers s; it depends negatively on the costs of computer technology V.3.2. Relative wages
To solve the equilibrium relative wages in efﬁciency units, Eqs. (5) and (6) are
substituted into the relative demand equation (2). Before turning to the equilibrium wages,
consider relative wages after the complete diffusion of computers and V ¼ 0:
ws
wu
¼ y
s
yu
 r
w0s
w0u
. (7)
Eq. (7) shows that relative wages after diffusion have changed with a factor ðys=yuÞr.
Wage inequality will be higher if ysoyu and skilled and unskilled workers are complements
(ro0), and if ys4yu and skilled and unskilled workers are substitutes (r40).
The empirical literature seems to point at r40, but the model leaves open both
alternatives.17
With an exogenously falling price of computer technology, the beneﬁts of adopting
are changing over time for all workers. Since the productivity levels of both skilled
and unskilled workers are concentrated on the intervals ½a; a and ½b;b, different stages
in the computer technology adoption process will occur. The order of these stages
depends both on the level of wages and break-even wages of skilled and unskilled workers.
Since a diffusion pattern in which the most productive skilled workers are the
ﬁrst to adopt—followed by the most productive unskilled workers, the least
productive skilled workers, and ﬁnally the least productive unskilled workers—seems to
be consistent with the actual patterns of adoption, our analysis focuses on this sequence of
adoption.18
Equilibrium wages in efﬁciency units are computed in each of the ﬁve stages of the
diffusion process: (i) No computer use, (ii) the high-wage skilled workers adopt, (iii) both
types of workers adopt, (iv) all skilled and a fraction of the unskilled workers adopt, and
(v) all workers use computers technology at work.19 Table 2 shows the relative wages in
efﬁciency units in each of the ﬁve stages. When there is no computer use, relative wages
depend on the supply of efﬁciency units, the distribution of productivity parameters and17A case in which ro0, often pointed at, is the complementarity between the manager and the secretary. If
ysoyu the secretary beneﬁts more from computer use than the manager. This means that, given the amount of
work, the demand for secretaries will fall.
18This assumption is consistent with the ﬁgures on computer use for 1984, 1989, and 1993 presented by Autor et
al. (1998). They show that computer technology use is higher for more educated workers but it is rising among all
different educational groups. It is also consistent with the characterization of the order of adoption modelled by
Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), except that we do not model explicitly the R&D process underlying the
development of computer technology, but merely focus on adoption.
19Note that it is possible that certain stages of diffusion will never become effective because of the overlapping
productivity parameters between skilled and unskilled workers. For example, given wages, proportional
productivity gains and the distribution of productivity parameters, an unskilled worker with productivity b could
reach the break-even point for computer use later than a skilled worker with productivity a, which would induce
computer use among unskilled workers when all skilled workers already have one.
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Table 2
Relative wages in efﬁciency units in each of the ﬁve stages of computer technology diffusion
Stage
Relative wages
weus
weuu
 
in efﬁciency units
No computer technology cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðas  asÞ
 !1=s
Productive skilled adopt cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðysas  asÞ þ
ðys  1Þ1sVs
ysas  as
 !1=s
Both types adopt cUepuðyubs þ ðwSepsðys  1Þ1s  cUepuðyu  1Þ1sÞVs
wSepsðysas  asÞ
 !1=s
All skilled adopt
cUepu ðyubs  bsÞ  ðyu  1Þ1sVs
 
wSepsysðas  asÞ
0
@
1
A
1=s
All workers adopt cUepuyuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748726the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor. In the other four stages,
relative wages in efﬁciency units also depend on y, V, and the additional units supplied.
Note that relative wages in efficiency units do not change anymore once every worker has
adopted a computer, even when V40. This is because the supply of the number of
efﬁciency units of labor, once all workers have adopted a computer, remains constant and
is independent of V.
Table 3 shows individual wages for two workers with productivity parameters a1 and a2
relative to worker j with productivity b. The level of the wages in efﬁciency units and
the size of the proportional productivity gain are assumed in such a way that the adoption
of computer technology takes place in the following order: a, a1, b, a, b and a, b, a2, a, b.
From the equations in Table 3 it becomes clear that the wages of all workers are inﬂuenced
once the ﬁrst worker adopts computer technology. In addition, once every worker
has adopted computer technology, it is not until V ¼ 0 that wages do not change any more
(Stage 6). To see this, we can compare the relative wages in each of the six stages. In
Stage 1 and Stage 2a the wage ratio of Worker 1 and Worker 2 equals a1=a2. In Stage 2b
Worker 1 adopts computer technology which raises the wage ratio to ða1ys  V Þ=a2. This
ratio is equal to a1=a2 at the break-even point but larger afterwards, leading to an increase
in within-group wage inequality. In Stage 3b, Worker 2 adopts computer technology
and inequality between the two workers becomes ða1ys  V Þ=ða2ys  V Þ. At the break-even
point at which Worker 2 adopts, the level of inequality between the two workers is at
its maximum level. Thereafter, it is falling depending on the pace at which the costs
of computer use fall. Because V is the same for both workers, Worker 1 suffers
less from paying the annual rent to use the computer technology. Hence, it is not
until V ¼ 0 that the ratio of wages for these two workers is at its level prior to
computerization.
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Table 3
Individual workers’ wages at different stages of computer technology diffusion relative to worker j with
productivity ba
Stage
Worker 1 with productivity parameter a1
1
a1
b
cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðas  asÞ
 !1=s
2a
a1
b
cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðysas  asÞ þ
ðys  1Þ1sVs
ysas  as
 !1=s
2b
a1y
s  V
b
cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðysas  asÞ þ
ðys  1Þ1sVs
ysas  as
 !1=s
3
a1y
s  V
b
cU epuðyubs þ ðwSepsðys  1Þ1s  cU epuðyu  1Þ1sÞVs
wSepsðysas  asÞ
 !1=s
4
a1y
s  V
b
cUepu ðyubs  bsÞ  ðyu  1Þ1sVs
 
wSepsysðas  asÞ
0
@
1
A
1=s
5
a1y
s  V
b yu  V
cU epuyuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
6
a1y
s
b yu
cU epuyuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
Worker 2 with productivity parameter a2
1
a2
b
cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðas  asÞ
 !1=s
2
a2
b
cUepuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðysas  asÞ þ
ðys  1Þ1sVs
ysas  as
 !1=s
3a
a2
b
cUepuðyubs þ ðwSepsðys  1Þ1s  cU epuðyu  1Þ1sÞVs
wSepsðysas  asÞ
 !1=s
3b
a2y
s  V
b
cU epuðyubs þ ðwSepsðys  1Þ1s  cU epuðyu  1Þ1sÞVs
wSepsðysas  asÞ
 !1=s
4
a2y
s  V
b
cU epuððyubs  bsÞ  ðyu  1Þ1sVsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
5
a2y
s  V
b yu  V
cU epuyuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
6
a2y
s
b yu
cU epuyuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
aComputer adoption is assumed to occur in the following order: a; a1;b; a; b and a; b; a2; a;b. Stage 1: no
computer use; Stage 2a: most productive skilled worker adopts; Stage 2b: Worker 1 adopts; Stage 3a: most
productive unskilled worker adopts; Stage 3b: Worker 2 adopts; Stage 4: all skilled workers have adopted; and
Stage 5: all workers have adopted, but V40. Stage 6: V ¼ 0. Wages for Worker 2 remain the same in Stages 2a
and 2b, hence only one equation for Stage 2 is reported. The same holds for Worker 1 in stages 3a and 3b.
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 727
ARTICLE IN PRESS
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–7487284. Pattern and timing of wage inequality
4.1. Within-group wage inequality
The individual wages in Table 3 are now used to more carefully analyze the pattern of
within-group wage inequality over time. Fig. 2 provides the wage pattern that results from
the model for skilled (Panel A) and unskilled (Panel B) workers. Since no worker has yet
adopted computer technology, in the ﬁrst stage all wage differentials remain the same. The
wage structure starts to change when V is sufﬁciently low for the most productive skilled
workers to adopt computer technology. In this second stage (which lasts until the most
productive unskilled worker adopts computer technology), skilled worker l adopts a
computer at alðys  1Þweus ¼ V and the wages of skilled workers change according to
qwk=q V
ak
¼ 1
ak
 a
s1
l y
s
ysas  as (8)
for skilled workers k who already adopted computer technology (akXal), and according to
qwm=q V
am
¼  a
s1
l
ysas  as (9)
for skilled workers m who did not yet adopt (amoal).
From Eqs. (8) and (9) a number of model features become apparent. First, once it
becomes beneﬁcial for worker l to adopt computer technology his wage increases relativeFig. 2. Within-group wage inequality over time.
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because ðqwl=q V Þ=al4ðqwm=q V Þ=am.20 The wages for the non-adopters change, but
only proportionally, and there is no increase in wage inequality among non-adopters in the
group of skilled workers. Since 1=ako1=al , there is wage convergence within the group of
computer users, leading to less wage inequality among computer users in the same group.
Second, it is not necessarily the case that the wages of computer adopters rise
immediately after adoption. Wages fall, relative to worker j with productivity b, for the
ﬁrst adopter a because
qwa
q V ¼ 1
asys
ysas  aso0.
However, the wages for the workers not adopting a computer fall by more because
asky
s  ðysas  asÞoas1k al , so it is rational to adopt computer technology at the break-
even point. In this stage of the diffusion process, wages relative to worker j with
productivity b rise immediately after adoption only if Eq. (8) is positive. This situation
might never occur in this stage but is more likely to occur if a a is relatively large.21
If
qwal
q V ¼ 1
asl y
s
ysas  as ¼ 0,
wages for worker l rise immediately after adoption. Note that, because 1=ako1=al , the
wages for worker k are still falling, relative to b, at this point in time. Wages of computer
users and non-users are still diverging, but at a lower pace, because when skilled and
unskilled workers are substitutes ðsX1Þ, the effect of less productive skilled workers
adopting, as1l , decreases for aloak.
In the third stage, when unskilled workers start to adopt computers (bðyu  1Þweuu ¼ V ),
the wage development of skilled workers, if worker l adopts computer technology
(alðys  1Þweus ¼ V ) can be described by
qwk=q V
ak
¼ 1
ak
 a
s1
l y
s
ysas  as þ
cU epu
wSeps
 
ys  1
yu  1
 s1
as1l y
s
ysas  as (10)
for skilled workers k who already adopted computer technology (akXal), and by
qwm=q V
am
¼  a
s1
l y
s
ysas  as þ
cU epu
wSeps
 
ys  1
yu  1
 s1
as1l
ysas  as (11)20If y is high relative to V, adoption of the whole group will occur at earlier stages. The maximum level of wage
inequality will be experienced earlier because the least productive worker will reach the break-even point of
adoption earlier on. On the other hand, V becomes negligible relative to the wage costs earlier on, which leads to a
faster drop in within-group wage inequality. If V falls faster over time, the adoption of computers and the effects
on the wage structure will occur faster and earlier on. The maximum level of within-group wage inequality will
remain the same because this only depends on a a and ys.
21The pattern and length of time of within-group wage inequality also depend on the productivity differential
a a, the costs of the computer relative to the productivity gain, and the speed at which V is falling over time. The
maximum level of within-group wage inequality only depends on a a and ys. When the initial productivity
differential is smaller, or the productivity gain relative to the computer cost is higher, or V is falling more rapidly
over time, the length of time of increasing and overall within-group wage inequality is shorter. A higher
productivity differential and a higher proportional productivity gain will induce a higher maximum level of
within-group wage inequality.
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substitutes, both the skilled computer users and the skilled non-users beneﬁt from the
increased productivity among unskilled workers, reﬂected in additional term in Eqs. (10)
and (11) compared to Eqs. (8) and (9). Due to the increased productivity of skilled
computer users, these workers gain more in relative terms than the skilled non-users.
Computer use among unskilled workers therefore stimulates the increasing within-group
wage inequality among skilled workers. Note that the development of relative wages of two
computer users or two non-users are not affected by computer adoption among unskilled
workers.
In the fourth stage, all skilled workers have adopted computer technology. Until
adoption is complete among unskilled workers (Stage 5), the wage developments for skilled
workers are described by
qwk=q V
ak
¼ 1
ak
þ ðy
u  1Þ
ðys  1Þ
 1s cU epuysabeðs1Þ
wSepsysðas  asÞ . (12)
From Eq. (12) it follows that if all skilled workers have adopted computer technology, but
not all unskilled workers have adopted yet, there will be wage convergence within the
group of skilled workers because 1=ao1= a.
If all workers have adopted computers, ðqwk=q V Þ=ak ¼ 1=ak, wage inequality within
the group of skilled workers behaves similarly to the previous situation. Finally, if V ¼ 0,
relative within-group wage inequality is back at its level prior to computerization.
A similar pattern of wage inequality within the group of unskilled workers can be
obtained. The only difference is that the timing of the different stages of adoption is
different. Essentially, the wage structure within both groups is characterized by only three
phases: (i) No computer use, (ii) some computer use, and (iii) every worker uses computer
technology. It is not until unskilled workers start to adopt computers that the adoption
process of skilled workers and within-group wage inequality accelerates because of the
increase in skilled workers’ wages. Such increasing wages are equivalent to faster
decreasing computer technology prices, since the wage/computer technology price ratio
drives the adoption process.4.2. Between-group wage inequality
Deﬁning the wage ratio of the workers with productivity a and b as between-group wage
inequality, it follows from Eqs. (8) and (9) that this ratio is falling when the ﬁrst skilled
worker adopts computer technology, leading to a lower level of between-group wage
inequality. Between-group wage inequality continues to fall until qwai=ðq V Þ ¼ 0, where
a4ai, or until the ﬁrst unskilled worker adopts computer technology. Between-group wage
inequality then increases because of two effects. The ﬁrst effect results from beneﬁts of the
falling costs of computer use for skilled workers, and the second effect results from the
increasing supply of efﬁciency units of unskilled labor after computer technology
adoption, which depresses the unskilled wages in terms of efﬁciency units. Note that
these effects do not depend on differences between ys and yu.
The development of between-group wage inequality in each stage of computer adoption
is displayed in Fig. 3. It reveals that between-group wage inequality is not likely to increase
after the ﬁrst workers have adopted computer technology. It is not until a non-negligible
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Fig. 3. Between-group wage inequality over time.
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group wage inequality starts to rise. The ﬁgure also shows that the pattern of between-
group wage inequality is levelling off at the end of stage 3 and again at the end of stage 4.
At the end of stage 3 almost all skilled workers have adopted computers, and at the end of
stage 4 all workers have adopted computers. Eventual between-group wage inequality
(when V ¼ 0) is described by Eq. (7).
Between-group wage inequality reaches its maximum level at the point where the least
productive unskilled worker is just about to adopt a computer. At that point, the wage of
the worker with productivity a equals
wca ¼
1
b
cU epuyuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsysðas  asÞ
 !1=s
ays  bðyu  1Þ
0
@
1
A (13)
compared to
wnca ¼
a
b
cU epuðbs  bsÞ
wSepsðas  asÞ
 !1=s
(14)
before computerization. The ratio of these two wages equals
wca
wnca
¼ y
u
ys
 1=s
ys  bðy
u  1Þ
wnca
. (15)
Eq. (15) has two interesting properties. First, the ratio of wages is increasing in wnca
meaning that a higher level of initial wage inequality between the most and least productive
worker leads to a higher peak in between-group wage inequality. This result implies that in
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wage inequality will be smaller. Even in relative terms, when compared to initial wage
inequality, the effects will be smaller. Second, it is also increasing in ys for r40, which
means that a higher productivity gain for skilled workers leads to a higher maximum level
of between-group wage inequality.
Immediately after the least productive worker has adopted a computer
ðqwa=q V Þ=aoðqwb=q V Þ= b, so between-group wage inequality falls. Finally, if
V ¼ 0, between-group wage inequality is described by Eq. (7), which shows that the level
of between-group wage inequality after complete diffusion depends on differences in the
proportional productivity ys=yu gains and the elasticity of substitution s between both
types of workers.
4.3. Sensitivity analysis
In the model we explain the diffusion of computer technology by a decrease of user
costs. In practice an increase in computer productivity (measured by increases in ys and yu)
might also generate diffusion. Qualitatively this yields similar results compared to the ones
presented above. When only a fraction of the workers have adopted computer technology
an increase in computer power/productivity increases the productivity of these workers
and leaves the productivity of those who have not adopted unaffected, in the same way as a
decrease in the price of computer technology affects relative productivity. The main
difference with the basic model is that the supply of efﬁciency units of labor of those who
have already adopted computer technology remains increasing. This increases the negative
effect of computer use on between-group wage inequality, which remains lower than in the
case of modelling through fall computer prices. When computer use is common among
both skilled and unskilled workers, productivity gains compensate each other, so these
effects disappear later on in the diffusion pattern and the conclusion from the model
remains similar.
When there are innovations in computer technology and these machines function for
several years, different vintages of computers will be available in the market. For the model
this implies that each worker can choose among several types with the most powerful
technology being the most expensive. Since skilled workers beneﬁt most from powerful
computers, the newest computers are adopted by the highest earners. The computer
technology they previously used is now used by workers with lower wages. In terms of the
model this implies that several waves of computer technology will at the same time diffuse
through the labor market and affect the wage distribution. Each wave has similar effects
on the wage structure so a continuous introduction of more powerful and productive
computer technology will prevent the diffusion process to end.
Despite the general purpose character of computer technology, the assumption that in
the end the costs of annually renting computer technology are at a level so that every single
worker is able to use computer technology at work might be too strict. In addition, it might
be the case that when all possible (or cost efﬁcient) inventions have been explored there are
no feasible applications for some jobs. Since the top earners among both skilled and
unskilled workers have adopted computer technology, it is likely that problems of costs
relative to wages and the unavailability of feasible applications will be occurring at
the bottom end of the wage distribution. We analyze the effects of incomplete diffusion
by assuming that V converges to v40. There are three interesting cases. First, when
ARTICLE IN PRESS
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 733v4aiðys  1Þweus both among skilled and unskilled workers there will be people who do not
adopt computer technology. Second, when aiðys  1Þweus 4v4biðy
u  1Þ only among the
unskilled a group of workers will never adopt the computer and third when vob
i
ðyu  1Þ
everyone adopts a computer, but the costs of the equipment will remain affecting the wage
distribution in the long run.22 These three cases will be explored.
When not all skilled workers adopt computer technology, within-group wage inequality
for skilled workers will then be permanently higher, and converge to ðays  vÞ= a. Since
workers will only adopt a computer when using it increases their net productivity ays  v
will be larger than a and thus ðays  vÞ= a4a= a. When v is relatively small compared to
the wage of the most able workers, the wage differential between the highest and the lowest
skilled worker will be almost ys times higher than initial within-group wage inequality.
When the remaining cost of using computer technology at work are higher, within-group
wage inequality will be lower.
A similar condition holds for long run within-group wage inequality among unskilled
workers: ðbyu  vÞ= b4b= b. When all skilled workers have adopted, but a small fraction
of unskilled workers have not the following happens for our measure of between-group
wage inequality (a b). When the least productive worker does not adopt, and V
converges to a level v, between-group wage inequality equals
ays  v
b
4
ays  v
b yu  v4
ays
b yu
.
This implies that wage inequality is larger than in the case when all workers adopt, and
larger than the case in which the costs of computer use equal 0. Long-run between-group
wage inequality depends positively on the distance a b and the size of the proportional
productivity gain, and negatively on v. When the share of unskilled workers who do not
adopt is larger, the supply of unskilled labor in efﬁciency units will be lower. This increases
the price of an efﬁciency unit of unskilled labor and thus moderates the effects on between-
group wage inequality.
Another possibility would be that although all workers adopt, the annual computer
costs do not become negligible relative to wages. Long-run within-group wage inequality
will be higher after computerization, since
ays  v
a ys  v4
ays
a ys
and
byu  v
b yu  v4
byu
b yu
,
i.e., the annual costs of renting computer technology are a heavier burden on workers
with lower levels of productivity and wages. The same argument holds for long-run22The way of modelling the diffusion of computer technology up to a certain level of usage is consistent with the
model on the diffusion of general purpose technologies by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995). They model an
instance in which the coordination between the developers of computer technology and the application sectors is
characterized by coordination and information problems and uncertainty. This leads to a too low level
of development of new applications in equilibrium; in terms of our model a too high V relative to wages, given ys
and yu.
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ays  v
b yu  v4
ays
b yu
.
As mentioned above, if in the long run v40, this has less of an impact on wage inequality
than if in the long run not all workers have adopted computer technology.
5. Empirical analysis
The model offers an explanation how recent increases in wage inequality can be
connected to the adoption and diffusion of computer technology at work. Here we will
document new empirical ﬁndings for the United States and Germany that are consistent
with the main message of the model. The Appendix at the end includes a detailed data
description, here we only focus on the most salient features.
5.1. Wage distributions
Differences in the wages of skilled and unskilled workers will be affected by both
differences in the timing of individual computer adoption and aggregate effects related to
the supply of skilled and unskilled labor. Assuming that workers with the same wage have
the same probability to adopt a computer, it is possible to isolate the aggregate supply
effects from the individual effects by comparing workers from both groups earning the
same wages at some point in time. We have taken the annual wages of the skilled U.S.
workers at the 40th and 50th percentile and looked for the unskilled workers earning the
same annual wages in 1963. It turns out that these are the wages of the unskilled workers at
the 75.7th and 83.9th percentile of the unskilled wage distribution.23
Fig. 4 shows the wage differentials between both groups keeping the relative position
within each group constant at these percentiles. The picture reveals that wage differentials
rise somewhat and are positive until the early 1970s. From then on until the mid-1980s the
wages for unskilled workers are higher. Around 1980 there is a turning point in the wage
differential in favor of skilled workers.24 Fig. 4 suggests that workers with the same
productivity in 1963, but who differ with respect to the group they belong to, have
experienced a different pattern of wages over time. Some have argued that the composition
of the groups of workers changed over time, inﬂuencing the ‘‘quality’’ of the groups
workers belong to. Acemoglu (2002) shows that composition effects are unlikely to have
inﬂuenced wages over time and that changes in the structure of wages over the past decades
cannot be explained by composition effects, but reﬂect changes in returns to skills.
Autor et al. (1998, Table 1) report that the employment shares of higher educated
workers have been increasing in the period 1960–1996. The share of college graduates
increased from 10.6% in 1960 to 28.3% in 1996, where the largest increase took place in23These percentiles of the wage distribution of both groups are taken because at these percentiles there exists a
great deal of overlap between the wages of both groups of workers. The percentiles do not exactly match because
not all possible values of wages are present in the sample. Actually the 75.7th and 83.9th percentile of the unskilled
wage distributions are somewhat above the 40th and 50th percentile of the skilled wage distribution.
24This pattern of between-group wage inequality is consistent with the ﬁgures presented by Katz and Murphy
(1992) using similar data for the period 1963–1987, and the analysis of Krusell et al. (2000) for the period
1963–1992.
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L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 735the period 1960–1980 (from 10.6% to 20.4%). In the same period the number of high
school graduates increased modestly from 27.7% to 33.4%, but the share of high school
dropouts has fallen from 49.5% to 9.4%. This increase in the relative supply of skilled
labor has been documented too by Acemoglu (2002, Figure 1) who shows that there has
been no tendency for the returns to college education to fall after this remarkable increase
in supply. Only in the 1970s the returns to college education fell, but then rose sharply
during the 1980s and early 1990s. The increase in relative wages since 1980 seems to be too
high to be accounted for by the slowdown in the growth of the supply of higher educated
since the 1980s only (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Card and Lemieux, 2001).25
More importantly, the timing of the increase in between-group wage inequality around
1980 and the increase in within-group wage inequality among unskilled workers are
unexplained. In addition, within-group wage inequality among skilled workers seems to
have increased independently of the fall in returns to schooling in the 1970s and the sharp
rise in the 1980s and early 1990s.25Competing explanations are the role of globalization pressures in reducing the relative demand for less
educated workers, the decline in unionization and the value of the minimum wage. See Katz and Autor (1999) for
an overview of the limited impact of these explanations to explain the developments in the United States since the
1960s.
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An important implication of the diffusion model is that wages are a major determinant
of computer use. Many authors since Krueger (1993) have reported a high correlation
between computer use and wages by estimating a wage equation including a dummy for
computer use. Frequently this relationship has been interpreted as an effect of computer
use on wages. By using panel data, Entorf and Kramarz (1997) and Entorf et al. (1999)
have shown that this interpretation is based on a spurious correlation. The best way to
show that wages determine to a large extent computer adoption is to estimate the
relationship between computer use and wages, without any other control variable to
predict differences in computer use between groups for which there exist well documented
wage differentials. The best example is to investigate the relationship between computer
use (cu) and age. To do so, we ran the OLS regression cu ¼ cþ a lnðwÞ þ  for both
countries (using the 1997/1998 data) and plot the actual computer use and the predicted
computer use per age group. Fig. 5 presents the results. Both panels show that by only
using wages we are able to replicate the age pattern of computer use in a precise manner.
There is some tendency for lower computer use among the oldest workers, but the pattern
predicted by the wage captures the main pattern.26
An interesting implication of this relationship between wages and computer use is that
differences between the United States and Germany should be related to differences in the
wage structure in these countries. To test whether differences in the wage distributions
between both countries are determining the different adoption patterns, we performed a
shift–share analysis of the diffusion of computer technology use in the United Stated and
Germany, disentangling increased computer use conditional on wages and the effect of
changes in the wage structure on the adoption of computer technology. Monthly wages in
each year have been divided into 300 U.S. dollar intervals. For each interval the fraction of
computer users in the workforce in a certain year has been calculated, which suggests a
strong positive relationship between computer use and wages. Based on this information
for the periods 1984/1985–1992/1993 and 1992/1993–1997/1998, we calculated the increase
in computer use keeping the wage structure constant. In Table 4 it is shown that although
the increase in computer use in the United States has been larger between 1984 and 1993
than in Germany over the period 1985–1992 (20.2 relative to 17.2 percentage points), the
absolute increase conditional on the 1984 wage distribution has been almost equal to the
changes in Germany (4.8 versus 3.9 percentage points). Hence, it is likely that the faster
increase in computer technology adoption over this period is to a large extent due to
changes in the wage structure in the United States. In the second period, the increase in
computer adoption in Germany is higher than in the United States (17.8 versus 7.7
percentage points), but again this seems to result from the speciﬁc shape of the wage
structure rather than from increased adoption as such (4.5 versus 2.9 percentage points).
The changes in the wage structure might of course be endogenous and result from26Comparable pictures are obtained when using only a dummy for workers earning more than the 46th
percentile in the wage distribution (46% of the workers in both the United States and Germany do not use
computer technology at work in 1997/1998), using a set of dummies for several wage brackets, including a gender
dummy, etc. Similar exercises for earlier years provide similar patterns with the negative effect of age on computer
use rising when we go back further in time.
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Fig. 5. Actual and predicted computer technology use by age in the United States (1997) (Panel A) and Germany
(1998) (Panel B). Note: See the text for details.
Table 4
Computer technology adoption and the wage distributiona
Year Computer use Computer use subject to distr. t 1
United States 1984 .261
1993 .463 .309
1997 .540 .492
U.S. changes 1984–1993 .202 .048
1993–1997 .077 .029
Germany 1985 .187
1992 .359 .226
1998 .537 .404
German changes 1985–1992 .172 .039
1992–1998 .178 .045
aComputer technology use in the United States is available from the October Supplements to the CPS. For
Germany the numbers are referring to 1985, 1992 and 1998 and are taken from the Qualiﬁcation and Career
Survey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) and the Federal Employment Service
(IAB). The data refer to workers employed on a full-time and full-year basis.
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L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748738computer adoption, but the analyses show that the pattern of diffusion is consistently
explained by the wage structure at a given point in time.
If wages determine computer use and the United States and Germany have access to the
same technology at the same price, the adoption of computers should be the same in both
countries when we condition on wages. We therefore transformed the wages of German
workers into dollar equivalents, using the appropriate exchange rate, and divided all
workers in wage groups of .2 in terms of log wages. Fig. 6 presents the average computer
use for U.S. and German workers for each wage group. The panels show that the adoption
by wage group is remarkably similar in both countries. Especially in 1984/1985 and 1997/
1998 both curves ﬁt well, with only slightly higher computer use among high-wage workers
in Germany and slightly higher computer use in the middle income groups in the United
States. In 1992/1993 German computer adoption seems to be lagging behind somewhat. Of
course there is a one year difference in the data between Germany and the United States in
a period of rapid computer diffusion, but the fact that the exchange rate fell rapidly in the
years prior to 1992/1993, thereby increasing German wages in dollars, might explain why
the adoption is lagging behind somewhat in this year. Overall, the pictures reveal that
differences in the wage structure explain to a large extent differences in adoption rates
between both countries.
5.3. Between-group wage inequality
In addition to different wage distributions in the United States and Germany, the model
predicts that the level and pattern of between-group wage inequality depends on
differences in the relative rates of adoption over time. More precisely, if the rate of
computer technology adoption among unskilled workers is higher than the rate of
adoption among skilled workers, skilled workers beneﬁt as a group thereby increasing
between-group wage inequality.
Table 5 reports changes in the wage differentials between percentile groups of skilled and
unskilled U.S. workers earning the same wages in 1963; i.e., the same workers analyzed in
Fig. 4. The ﬁrst column in the upper panel reports the 1984–1989, 1989–1993 and
1993–1997 changes in the log wage differential between a skilled worker at the 40th
percentile of the skilled distribution and an unskilled worker at the 75.5th percentile of the
unskilled wage distribution. Similar numbers are reported in the second column for the
skilled and unskilled workers at the 50th and 83.9th percentile of their respective wage
distributions. The third column reports the change in the fraction of computer technology
use among unskilled workers minus the change in the fraction computer use among the
skilled workers: CUtskilled  CUtunskilled  ðCUtdskilled  CUtdunskilledÞ. A similar analysis is
performed for Germany and shown in the lower panel of Table 5.
Between-group wage inequality should rise (fall) if the rate of adoption of computer
technology is higher among unskilled (skilled) workers because the rise in the number of
efﬁciency units of unskilled (skilled) workers depresses the wages of the group. This means
that there should exist a positive relationship between the numbers in the ﬁrst two columns
and the third column in Table 5. For the United States this positive correlation is present
because a relatively higher rate of relative computer technology adoption among unskilled
workers seems to lead to a relatively larger change in the wage differential between skilled
and unskilled workers, e.g., compare the wage changes in the ﬁrst row of Table 5 (.045 and
.076, respectively) in which the relative rate of computer adoption is high with the negative
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Fig. 6. Computer technology use conditional on wages in the United States and Germany. Panel A: 1985/1985,
Panel B: 1992/1993, Panel C: 1997/1998. Note: See the text for details.
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748 739wage changes in the second row of Table 5 (:063 and :061, respectively) in which the
relative rate of computer adoption is low. In the period 1993–1997 the pattern of adoption
is reversed again, and likely to increase between-group wage inequality; although to a
lesser extent. Comparing these calculations to the pattern of between-group wage
inequality displayed in Fig. 1 suggests a consistent pattern of increasing between-group
wage inequality in the 1980s and a slowdown in the 1990s.
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Table 5
The relationship between the rising use of computer technology and wage differentials between groups of skilled
and unskilled workers in the United States and Germanya
United States D Wage diff. D Wage diff. DCU U  DCU S DS=U
40th S 75.5th U 50th S 83.9th U
1984–1989 .045 .076 .164 .040
1989–1993 .063 .061 .009 .036
1993–1997 .034 .029 .064 .037
Germany D Wage diff. D Wage diff. DCU U  DCU S DS=U
40th S 76.9th U 50th S 85.7th U
1985–1992 .087 .062 .089 .043
1992–1998 .006 .015 .116 .037
aCU is computer use. The ﬁrst two columns report the changes in the log wage differential between two
percentiles in the wage distribution of the skilled and unskilled workers for the relevant years. The third column
reports the change in the use of computer technology among unskilled workers minus the change in the use of
computer technology among skilled workers for the relevant time periods. The ﬁnal column shows the change in
the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers. Computer technology use in the United States is available
from the October Supplements to the CPS. For Germany the numbers are referring to 1985, 1992 and 1998 and
are taken from the Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training
(BIBB) and the Federal Employment Service (IAB). The wage data for the United States are taken from the
March Current Population Surveys and the German data from the Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey of the
German Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) and the Federal Employment Service (IAB). The data
refer to workers employed on a full-time and full-year basis.
L. Borghans, B. ter Weel / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 715–748740Consistent with the predictions of the model, for Germany a similar and less strong
pattern is obtained. For the period 1992–1998, in which the relative rate of computer
adoption among unskilled workers is high, we would expect the wage differential to rise. In
comparison with the 1985–1992 period it does rise, but in absolute terms the pattern is not
very strong. Investigating the pattern of between-group wage inequality in Germany over
time in Fig. 1 suggests that falling between-group wage inequality until the early 1990s and
the tendency towards rising between-group wage inequality since the mid-1990s is
consistent with the pattern of higher relative rates of computer technology adoption for
skilled workers in the 1980s and higher relative rates of adoption for unskilled workers in
the 1990s.
Changes in the relative wages are of course also affected by changes in supply of skilled
and unskilled workers. The fourth column of Table 4 therefore reports the changes in the
fractions of skilled workers in the periods concerned. In contrast with the change around
1980, the increase in the supply of skilled workers turns out to be relatively constant in the
1980s and 1990s. It is therefore unlikely that shifts in the supply of skilled workers can
account for the dynamics in the wages as have been reported in this paper.
Our overall reading of the comparative empirical analysis is that the ﬁgures suggest that
the diffusion of computer technology and the distribution of wages is consistent with our
theory of high-wage workers adopting computers ﬁrst, that the rate of computer
technology adoption is in accordance with the wage distributions in both countries, and
that the relatively early effects of computer technology on between-group wage inequality
in the United States are likely to be due to the early computer adoption of unskilled
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1990s.
5.4. Exploring the magnitude of the model
A crucial question arising from these analyzes is whether the theoretical predictions
made by our diffusion model are in a order of magnitude that corresponds to the empirical
data on increased wage inequality in the United States. To do so, we ﬁrst need to compute
the costs of using computer technology.
5.4.1. Computer costs
We estimate the annual costs of using a computer to be $6,567 in 1997, which accounts
for about 21% of the average worker’s real annual wage in the United States. This ﬁgure is
computed as follows.
First, using the ‘‘investment in information processing equipment and software’’ data
collected by NIPA and dividing this number by the computer using workforce in full-time
equivalents27 yields computer costs of $4,530.28 Second, regressing the relative number of
workers in computer related jobs (cw)29 on computer users (c) by sector and weighing by
industry size, yields (standard errors in brackets) cw ¼ 1:38ð:003Þ þ :063ð:005Þc. To obtain
a conservative estimate for the cost of technical assistance, we left out the sectors of
industry with relatively high fractions of computer related job.30 Since the average monthly
wages of workers in computer related jobs equal $2,692, we estimate the costs of assistance
for each individual worker to be equal to $2,037.
It has been well documented that the price of computer equipment has been falling
extremely rapidly over time (e.g., Jorgenson, 2001). Figures collected by NIPA suggest that
investments in computer equipment are only some 20–25% of total investments in
information processing equipment and software over the 1990s. Investments in software27Full-time equivalent employees equal the number of employees on full-time schedules plus the number of
employees on part-time schedules converted to a full-time basis. The number of full-time equivalent employees in
each industry is the product of the total number of employees and the ratio of average weekly hours per employee
for all employees to the average weekly hours per employee on full-time schedules.
28Autor et al. (1998) report computer investments per full time equivalent worker to be $2,545 in 1990, which is
equivalent to about $5,000 per full time equivalent computer user. Figures for 1960, 1970 and 1980 yield
comparable investments per full-time equivalent computer user. Computer use is taken from the October 1997
School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS. There is likely to be measurement error in the NIPA data because the
Bureau of Economic Analysis does often not directly measure information processing equipment and software at
high frequency, but imputes these data. See Berndt and Morrison (1995), and Autor et al. (1998) for a discussion.
See also Allen (2001) for a more detailed treatment of computer investments and investments in science and
technology related to the wage structure in the United States.
29These occupations are ‘‘Computer systems analysts and scientists’’ (CPS Occupational Classiﬁcation Code for
Detailed Occupational Categories 064), ‘‘Operations and systems researchers and analysts’’ (065), ‘‘Computer
science teachers’’ (129), ‘‘Computer programmers’’ (229), ‘‘Tool programmers, numerical control’’ (233),
‘‘Computer operators’’ (308), ‘‘Peripheral equipment operators’’ (309), ‘‘Data-entry keyers’’ (385), ‘‘Data
processing equipment repairers’’ (525), and ‘‘Ofﬁce machine repairers’’ (538).
30Sectors of industry with more than 10% computer related employment are ‘‘Computer and data processing
services’’ (CPS Industry Classiﬁcation Code for Detailed Industry 732), ‘‘Telegraph and miscellaneous
communications services’’ (442), ‘‘Not speciﬁed utilities’’ (472), ‘‘Computers and related equipment’’ (322),
‘‘Electrical repair shops’’ (752), ‘‘Professional and commercial equipment and supplies’’ (510), and ‘‘Radio, TV,
and computer stores’’ (633).
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investments. The quality-adjusted prices of software (e.g., Jorgenson, 2001, Figure 2), and
other computer related investments have hardly been falling over time. The overall annual
decline in the costs of information processing equipment and software has been 2.1% over
the period 1959–2001.31 This suggests that the adoption rate of computers at work is likely
to be slower than the rate of fall in the price of computer equipment, and that the costs of
using computer technology are non-negligible relative to the workers’ wages.
Differences in the quality of computer technology used by different workers are not
explicitly considered in the model. When considering different vintages of computers in a
perfectly competitive market, the most productive workers would be assigned to the most
recent vintage. In addition, the costs of computer technology might also be different for
different workers. For example, large ﬁrms might have an advantage in maintenance and
technical assistance, which leads to lower computer costs per worker. Next to that, some
workers need less expensive computer technology than others, which induces earlier
adoption, all other things equal. Finally, some workers perform tasks on the basis of
ready-made applications, whereas for others with higher wages and higher productivity
gains no application is available yet. However, for simplicity we make the assumption that
the costs of the computer technology are given to the worker and are equal for all workers.
5.4.2. Magnitude
To think about the magnitude of these effects, compare two skilled workers, one with a
wage corresponding to the 90th percentile of the wage distribution and the other earning
the 10th percentile wage. If we compare the position of these two workers between 1974
and 1997, it is reasonable to assume that none of these workers made use of computer
technology in 1974, while according to the diffusion argument made in this paper one
might expect only high-wage workers using computer technology in 1997. This means that
in 1997 only the worker with a wage corresponding to the 90th percentile of the wage
distribution is using computer technology at work. Hence, for this worker only the joint
productivity of his labor and the computer he is using has to be taken into account in 1997.
We assume that inﬂation and exogenous productivity shocks affect all skilled workers to
a similar extent. So, the productivity pnc of the 90th percentile workers—had they not
adopted a computer—in 1997 can be predicted by
pnc ¼
w10th97
w10th74
w90th74 , (16)
where w10th97 equals the 1997 wage of the skilled worker at the 10th percentile of the wage
distribution, and w10th74 and w
90th
74 are representing the wages of the skilled workers at the
10th and 90th percentile of the wage distribution in 1974. Actual productivity (pc) of the
workers at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution will be equal to wages plus the
annual rental costs of computer technology in 1997 (V97), i.e.,
pc ¼ w90th97 þ V97. (17)
A back of the envelop estimate of the productivity increase that can be attributed to
computer technology adoption can be obtained by taking the ratios of these two31These numbers and calculations are based on NIPA ﬁgures and consistent with the number and calculations
presented by Jorgenson (2001).
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1þ y ¼ p
90th
c
p90thnc
¼ w
90th
97 þ V 97
w10th97
w10th74
w90th74
. (18)
Using our estimate of the annual cost of computer technology use of $6,567 in 1997, all
components of this calculation are known. For skilled workers we ﬁnd y ¼ :292. Similar
reasoning yields y ¼ :282 for unskilled workers. Such productivity gains of about 30
percentage seem to be reasonable and are in line with the estimates presented by Bresnahan
et al. (2002, Table 8, p. 365). They argue that there are large adjustments costs to the
successful use of computers, which are not only due to the installation of computers itself
but also to the change in organization structure, technical assistance and other co-
inventions going along with computerization.
Furthermore, combining the annual costs of computer use with this productivity
increase provides us with break-even wages for computer adoption among both types of
workers. For 1997 this break-even wage is equal to $23,278 when we use the productivity
increase of 28.2% (unskilled parameter) and $22,490 for the productivity increase of
29.2% (skilled parameter). This corresponds to the 19th percentile skilled worker, and the
54th percentile of unskilled worker. Predicted adoption of 81% among skilled workers and
46% among unskilled workers therefore ﬁts relatively well to observed computer use in
both groups in 1997 (Table 1: 76.6% and 42.8%, respectively).
Changes in between-group wage inequality are a result of both productivity changes due
to computer technology use and changes in the price per efﬁciency unit of labor due to
shifts in supply and demand. Comparison of the 90th percentile skilled worker to the 10th
percentile unskilled workers—again assuming the ﬁrst to use computer technology from
1984 onwards, while the latter has not yet adopted a computer in 1997—allows us to
calculate the wage in efﬁciency units of the skilled workers as
weus ¼
ws þ Vt
1þ y . (19)
Multiplying the supply in terms of people by 1 + y times the fraction of the wage sum of
computer users within the group of skilled and unskilled workers, yields estimates of the
development of the supply in terms of efﬁciency units. Regressing the log wage ratio on the
log supply ratio and a time trend for the four years for which computer technology use at
work (1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997) is available reduces the time trend in the regression
equation from .018 to .012. This estimate suggests that our diffusion argument explains
approximately one-third of the increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers in the United States.
6. Concluding remarks
When considering the allocation of computer technology within and between groups of
workers, it becomes apparent that those workers who have adopted computers gain from
the increased productivity of using computer technology. Within the same group, workers
who have not adopted computer technology suffer from an increased supply of efﬁciency
units of labor. Between groups, it depends on the degree of substitutability and the amount
of overlap between different groups in the labor market. Hence, to understand the wage
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group effects of computer adoption. Our model indeed shows that it is important to
explicitly consider who adopts computer technology at what point in time to help
understand the effects of computers on the wage structure. Applying the features that
computer adoption is based on cost–beneﬁt considerations, that productivity differentials
between and within groups of workers are important in explaining the moment in time of
adoption, and the explicit assignment of workers to the computer technology, our model is
consistent with both the pattern and timing of the changes in the U.S. wage structure over
the past four decades and the changes in the German wage structure since the early 1980s.
There are two main directions for future research. First, our model shows the
importance of the distinction between individual and group effects (in the sense that
groups of workers produce a similar product) when considering computer technology
adoption. It is therefore crucial to distinguish the right groups of homogenous workers in
the labor market. An avenue of further investigation would be to look more carefully into
which groups of workers substitute each other and which groups do not. Particularly for
countries other than the United States (and the United Kingdom) there appears to be a less
strong division between skilled and unskilled workers (e.g., Abraham and Houseman, 1995
for Germany), which is likely to have an impact on the results in empirical work. Second,
the model is able to reﬂect the pattern and timing of wage inequality in the United States
and Germany. Crucial distinctions between both countries are the differences in initial (i.e.,
before computer technology became around) wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers and the substitutability of both groups of labor. It would be interesting to analyze
other countries that vary in initial wage inequality and the substitutability of skilled and
unskilled workers. Of interest here are differences between on the one hand the United
States and the United Kingdom and on the other hand Germany and France, but also
differences between continental European countries, comparing the very equalitarian
Scandinavian countries with southern European countries such as France, Spain and Italy
that have large wage inequality. Also the comparison between the United States and
Canada could be very interesting from this perspective.Acknowledgments
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(CPS)
A.1. Skilled and unskilled workers
Skilled workers are deﬁned as workers with at least a completed college education and
unskilled workers as workers with educational levels below a completed college education.
We only use full-time, full-year workers who reported to be employed in the previous year.
Full-time, full-year, wage and salary workers are those working at least 35 h per week and
worked at least 40 weeks in the previous calendar year.
A.2. Wages
We use annual earnings for four reasons. First, information on weeks worked and usual
weekly hours in the previous calendar year is available in the March CPS from 1976
onwards. The 1963–1975 period is only covered by bracketed weeks worked information
and hours worked last week. This makes it harder to measure weekly or hourly earnings
(e.g., Katz and Autor, 1999; Lemieux, 2006). Second, computer technology can be shared
among part-time workers, which induces computer use at lower wage levels as well. Third,
since the dispersion in productivity parameters, reﬂected by wage differentials within the
groups of skilled and unskilled workers, is essential to the model, no correction has been
made for demographic factors. Finally, computer use is only available on a yearly basis
from the October 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997 School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS.
So, a worker makes an annual decision to rent a computer for that year. We only use
annual wages between $1,000 and $900,000.
A.3. Computer technology
Individual computer use has been calculated from the October 1984, 1989, 1993, and
1997 School Enrollment Supplements to the CPS as the fraction of currently employed
full-time, year-round workers who answered yes to the question, ‘‘Do you use a computer
directly at work?’’. The survey deﬁnes a computer as a desktop terminal or PC with
keyboard and monitor and does not include an electronic cash register or a hand-held data
device. To calculate these frequencies in 1984, 1989, 1993, and 1997, respectively, 60,396,
58,401, 59,710, and 52,753 observations were used. We have used full-time, year-round
workers only to compute computer use at work because these workers have also been used
to calculate wages.
Appendix B. Germany
For Germany we use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the
Qualiﬁcation and Career Survey of the German Federal Institute for Vocational Training
(BIBB) and the Federal Employment Service (IAB). The ﬁrst survey is more precise on
wages, while the second provides the best information about the use of computer
technology. For analyses in which computer use and wages are combined, we use the
BIBB/IAB data. See also Borghans et al. (2006) for similar analyses and a detailed
description.
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Skilled workers are deﬁned in both surveys as workers with at least a completed college
education (Fachhochschule) and unskilled workers as workers with educational levels
below a completed college education.
B.2. Wages
Changes in the German wage structure in the period 1984–2001 are illustrated using data
on the monthly earnings of full-time, wage and salary workers from the GSOEP. Full-time,
full-year, wage and salary workers are those working at least 36 h per week. Fig. 1 reports
the ﬁgures for between-group wage inequality (Panel A) and within-group wage inequality
among skilled and unskilled German workers (Panels B and C). The BIBB/IAB survey
asks respondents to report their monthly wages in 500 DM classes. Following DiNardo
and Pischke (1997) we assumed the wage to equal the middle of the reported wage class.
B.3. Computer technology
Individual computer use has been calculated from the 1985, 1992, and 1998 BIBB/IAB
surveys as the fraction of currently employed full-time workers who use computer
technology at work. The survey deﬁnes a computer as a desktop terminal or PC with
keyboard and monitor and does not include an electronic cash register or a hand-held data
device.
Appendix C. March CPS versus May and ORG CPS wage data
DiNardo et al. (1996) provide evidence from the May CPS data that residual (or within-
group) wage inequality has been stable in the 1970s and only increased in the period
1979–1985 (using the Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG)). Thereafter, residual wage
inequality grows smoothly. Most recently, Lemieux (2006) compares the wage series from
the March Annual Demographic Supplement (ADS) of the CPS with the May (1973–1979)
and ORG (from 1979 onwards) Supplements of the CPS. He ﬁnds that the timing and
extent of the growth in within-group wage inequality depends on the wage measure used.
Katz and Autor (1999) review the wage changes in residual inequality from 1960 onwards
from three different sources: Decennial censuses, and March CPSs and May/ORG CPSs.
For the 1960s there is no evidence that residual wage inequality is increasing. In the 1970s
all three sources show increases in the 90–10 level of residual wage inequality, in which the
March CPS data reveal the largest increase and the census the lowest increase. The same
holds for the 1980s, although the ORG CPS now shows the largest increase in the overall
90–10 level closely followed by the March CPS series. For the 1990s March and ORG CPS
series are comparable. Overall though, they conclude that the relative magnitude and
timing of the trends shown in these three data sources are less well understood and less
consistent than those for between-group wage inequality. Nevertheless, there is
considerable evidence that within-group wage inequality started to increase in the 1970s
(see also Acemoglu, 2002). In Borghans and ter Weel (2004c) we show after carefully
comparing March–May/ORG, that the use of the March CPSs is preferred for our analysis
of the U.S. wage structure in the period 1963–2000.
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